Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How buybacks eliminate opportunism in vertical contracting
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20121640