Versal normal form at the Lagrange equilibrium L4
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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We de ̄ne Random Belief Equilibrium (RBE) in ̄nite, normal form games. We assume that a player's beliefs about the strategy choices of others are randomly drawn from a belief distribution. This distribution is dispersed around a central strategy pro ̄le, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each player chooses a best response relative to her drawn beliefs. (2) The expected choice of each player coincides wi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Differential Equations
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0022-0396
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0396(86)90080-x