Verification of flow control protocols
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
automatic verification of authentication protocols using genetic programming
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ing nonces by constants, an unbounded execution of the NeedhamSchroeder protocol can be represented by the following set CNS of clauses: ⇒ I(enca(〈na, a〉, pub(i))) I(enca(〈x, a〉, pub(b))) ⇒ I(enca(〈x, nb〉, pub(a))) I(enca(〈na, y〉, pub(a))) ⇒ I(enca(y, pub(i))) For simplicity, we have only described the clauses corresponding to the case where A starts sessions with a corrupted agent I and B is w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0146-4833
DOI: 10.1145/1040124.1040125