Verification and Design of Zero-Sum Potential Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Simple Characterizations of Potential Games and Zero-sum Games
We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game—a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We present a unified framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games by deriving a simple but useful char...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IFAC-PapersOnLine
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2405-8963
DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.1236