Venture Capital Financing and the Informativeness of Earnings
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Convertible Preferred Stock in Venture Capital Financing∗
We develop a model in which cash-constrained entrepreneurs seek a venture capitalist (VC) to finance a new firm. Costly monitoring is employed by VCs to reduce entrepreneurial moral hazard. When monitoring reveals poor performance, VCs want to punish the entrepreneur with liquidation. However, when assets are specific and liquidation would lead to a loss, VCs choose to renegotiate the terms of ...
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I present a model of venture capital contracting in which contracts that involve a mixture of both debt and equity are efficient and dominate pure-equity and pure-debt financing. The optimal contract balances the venture capitalist’s incentive to intervene in the project and the entrepreneur’s desire for control. JEL classification: G24, G32
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1608-1625,2164-2257
DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2009.9720836