Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cognitive Theories of Consciousness
In the present chapter, we first overview the precursors that allowed the development of cognitive theories of consciousness, and in particular we consider the notions of attention, working-memory, modularity and the distinction between automatic and controlled processes. Then we present a selection of influential contemporary accounts of consciousness, based on three themes: consciousness resu...
متن کاملTheories of Consciousness
My target in this paper is "theories of consciousness". There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs handling with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better t...
متن کاملConsciousness, Theories of
Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys ...
متن کاملTheories of Access Consciousness
Theories of access consciousness address how it is that some mental states but not others are available for evaluation, choice behavior, and verbal report. Farah, O’Reilly, and Vecera (1994) argue that quality of representation is critical; Dehaene, Sergent, and Changeux (2003) argue that the ability to communicate representations is critical. We present a probabilistic information transmission...
متن کاملNatural theories of consciousness
Many people have thought that consciousness – particularly phenomenal consciousness, or the sort of consciousness which is involved when one undergoes states with a distinctive subjective phenomenology, or ‘feel’ – is inherently, and perhaps irredeemably, mysterious (Nagel 1974, 1986; McGinn 1991). And many would at least agree with Chalmers (1996) in characterising consciousness as the ‘hard p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0140-525X,1469-1825
DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x04290070