VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms
Consider an abstract social choice setting with incomplete information, where the number of alternatives is large. Albeit natural, implementing VCG mechanisms is infeasible due to the prohibitive communication constraints. However, if players restrict attention to a subset of the alternatives, feasibility may be recovered. This paper characterizes the class of subsets which induce an ex-post eq...
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Article history: Received 8 January 2011 Available online 28 January 2012 JEL classification: C78 D61 D63 I20
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.028