Various Approaches to Early Contractor Involvement in Relational Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Procedia Computer Science
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1877-0509
DOI: 10.1016/j.procs.2021.01.313