Variants of Ranked-Choice Voting from a Strategic Perspective

نویسندگان

چکیده

Ranked-choice voting has come to mean a range of electoral systems. Broadly, they can facilitate (a) majority winners in single-seat districts, (b) rule with minority representation multi-seat or (c) sweeps districts. Further, such systems combine rules encourage/discourage slate voting. This article describes five major versions used, abandoned, and/or proposed for US public elections: alternative vote, single transferable block-preferential voting, the bottoms-up system, and vote numbered posts. It then considers each from perspective ‘political strategist.’ Simple models (one two parties, another three) draw attention real-world strategic issues: effects on representation, importance party cues, reasons political strategist care about how voters rank choices. Unsurprisingly, different produce outcomes same sets ballots. Specific problems strategist’s are: ‘majority reversal,’ serving ‘two masters,’ undisciplined third-party (or ‘pure’ independents). Some these stem well-known phenomena, e.g., ranking truncation ‘vote leakage.’ The also alludes ‘vote-management’ tactics, i.e., rationing nominations ensuring even distributions first-choice votes. Illustrative examples American history comparative politics. A running theme is two-pronged failure Progressive Era reform wave: respect ranked voting's durability.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Politics and Governance

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2183-2463']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3955