Value of Information in Feedback Control: Global Optimality
نویسندگان
چکیده
The rate-regulation tradeoff, defined between two objective functions, one penalizing the packet rate and regulation cost, can express fundamental performance bound of networked control systems. However, characterization set globally optimal solutions in this tradeoff for multidimensional Gauss–Markov processes has been an open problem. In article, we characterize a policy profile that belongs to without imposing any restrictions on information structure or structure. We prove such consists symmetric threshold triggering based value certainty-equivalent non-Gaussian linear estimator. These policies are deterministic be designed separately. Besides, provide global optimality analysis $\mathbf{{VoI}}_{{\boldsymbol{k}}}$ , semantic metric emerges from as difference benefit cost data packet. it is containing sensory at time notation="LaTeX">${\boldsymbol{k}}$ transmitted controller only if becomes nonnegative. findings have important implications areas communication control.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['0018-9286', '1558-2523', '2334-3303']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.2022.3194125