Valuation of Public Utilities for ad valorem Taxation

Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Taxes

This note shows that in the Zodrow-Miesowski-Wilson model, the Nash equilibrium in capital taxes depends on whether these taxes are unit (as assumed in the literature) or ad valorem (as in reality). In a symmetric version of the model with Cobb-Douglas technology, public good provision is higher, and residents in both countries are better off, when countries compete in unit taxes.

Methods of Estimating Depreciation in Valuation of Public Utilities for Rate Making Purposes

Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition

This report on restructuring public utilities draws on both submissions prepared by the countries themselves and from a large body of work by the OECD on regulatory reform – including the sectoral reviews carried out by the Competition Committee, the publications of the OECD’s Regulatory Reform Project, the work of the OECD’s TISP Committee in telecommunications, work by the International Energ...

Regulating Debit Cards: The Case of Ad Valorem Fees

Debit cards have become an indispensable part of the U.S. payments system, accounting for more than a third of consumer payments at point of sale. With this development has come controversy: Card networks charge merchants fees that merchants believe are too high. And most of the fees are ad valorem—that is, based on transaction value—rather than fixed fees per transaction. Merchants are critica...

Failure of Ad Valorem and Specific Tax Equivalence under Uncertainty

Applying a framework of perfect competition under uncertainty, we contribute to the discussion of whether or not ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are equivalent. While this equivalence holds without price uncertainty, we show that ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are “almost never” equivalent in the presence of uncertainty if we demand equivalence to hold pathwise. Since we obtain this re...