Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mec...
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The existence of incentive-compatible, computationally-efficient protocols for combinatorial auctions with decent approximation ratios is one of the most central and well studied open questions in mechanism design. The only universal technique known for the design of truthful mechanisms is the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme, which is “maximal in range”, i.e., it always exactly op...
متن کاملCharacterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved in Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz [6], according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi field.
متن کاملKnightian Analysis of the VCG Mechanism in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions
We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player i has about the profile of true valuations, θ∗, consists of a set of distributions, from one of which θ∗ i has been drawn. The VCG mechanism guarantees very high social welfare both in singleand multi-good auctions, so long as Knightian pla...
متن کاملMaking VCG More Robust in Combinatorial Auctions via Submodular Approximation
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) protocol is a theoretically well-founded protocol that can be used for combinatorial auctions. However, the VCG has several limitations such as (a) vulnerability to false-name bids, (b) vulnerability to loser collusion, and (c) the outcome is not in the core. Yokoo, Matsutani, & Iwasaki (2006) presented a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mecha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/3232860