Utilities Included: Split Incentives in Commercial Electricity Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Utilities Included: Split Incentives in Commercial Electricity Contracts
The largest decile of commercial electricity customers comprises half of commercial sector electricity usage. We quantify a considerable split incentives problem that exists when these large firms are on electricity-included property lease contracts. Controlling for a rich set of variables that may correlate with selection into contract type, we use exogenous variation in weather shocks to show...
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The largest decile of commercial electricity customers comprises half of commercial sector electricity usage. We quantify a substantial split incentives problem that exists when these large rms are on electricity-included property lease contracts. Using exogenous variation in weather shocks, we show that customers on tenant-paid contracts use 6-14% less electricity in summer months. The policy ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Energy Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0195-6574
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.41.5.kjes