Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions1
We propose a priced options model for solving the exposure problem of bidders with valuation synergies participating in a sequence of online auctions. We consider a setting in which complementary-valued items are offered sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their item directly or through a priced option. In our model, the seller fixes the exercise price for t...
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This report studies the benefits of using priced options for solving the exposure problem that bidders with valuation synergies face in sequential auctions. We consider a model in which complementaryvalued items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their good directly or through a priced option, after fixing its exercise price. We analyze this m...
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In this paper we introduce a new option pricing mechanism for reducing the exposure problem encountered by bidding agents with complementary valuations when participating in sequential, second-price auction markets. Existing option pricing models have two main drawbacks: they either apply fixed exercise prices, which may deter bidders with low valuations, thereby decreasing allocative efficienc...
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In this paper we present a novel option pricing mechanism for reducing the exposure problem encountered by bidders with complementary valuations when participating in sequential, second-price auction markets. Existing option pricing models have two main drawbacks: they either apply a fixed exercise price, which may deter bidders with low valuations, thereby decreasing allocative efficiency, or ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1533-5399,1557-6051
DOI: 10.1145/2390209.2390211