Users' Impulsive Bidding Behavior in C2C Auction Platform

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Information Systems

سال: 2016

ISSN: 1229-8476

DOI: 10.5859/kais.2016.25.4.63