Upstream horizontal mergers, vertical contracts, and bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Upstream mergers, downstream mergers, and secret vertical contracts
In an industry characterised by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two vertical chains exist, with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, and show that the equilibrium prices are independent of whether upstream or downstream ̄rms have all the bargaining power. We then analyse two alternative mergers, and show that a downstream merger (which gi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.007