منابع مشابه
Universality of Nash Equilibria by Ruchira
Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an N-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From the Nash-Tognoli Theorem it follows that every compact differentiable manifold can be encoded as the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some game. Moreove...
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We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game—a common interest game whose common payoff to the players is at most equal to one—whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyh...
متن کاملNash and Correlated Equilibria
In this document we will look at useful facts and definitions about Nash and correlated equilibria for two person games. More specifically we’ll give a brief definition of both equilibria, and then we’ll point out the relation between them. We will next introduce a numerical approach aimed at calculating Nash Equilibria of a symmetric game we wish to explore in CME 334. A motivation for this ap...
متن کاملCoalitional Nash Equilibria
Let G be an N -player game in strategic form and C be a set of permissible coalition of players (exogenously given). A strategy profile σ is a coalitional-equilibrium if no permissible coalition in C has a unilateral deviation that profits to all its members. At the two extremes: when C contains only singleton players, σ reduces to a Nash equilibrium and when C consists on all coalitions of pla...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.28.3.424.16397