Uniqueness of nash equilibrium points in bimatrix games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Algorithm for Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games.
pi[M] = 3a(M). (Cf. Hirzebruch, ref. 4, Theorem 8.2.2, p. 85.) The proof of Lemma 1 is bagbd on the fact that 7rn+3(S5) is cyclic of order 24 for n > 5. t In the sense of J. H. C. Whitehead.'0 Any two regular neighborhoods of K in M are combinatorially equivalent by reference 10, Theorem 23. 1 Blij, F. van der, "An invariant of quadratic forms mod 8.," Proc. Nederl. Akad. v. Wetenschappen, Ser....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90083-3