Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information

Unions, Bargaining and Strikes

Cyclical Strikes and Human Capital Accumulation under Asymmetric Information

Strikes are totally ine¢cient from an economic point of view. They occur when the two parties that bargain over a contract do not ...nd an agreement and the result is a loss of utility for both. In spite of their clear ine¢ciency in the real world strikes are very common both in the rich economies as well as in the poor countries. Moreover recent empirical literature found some regularities ove...

Strikes and Wages: A Test of an Asymmetric Information Model

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2010 / 76 Unions ' relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining

We consider a model of wage determination with private information in a duopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.

Negotiation with Private Information: Litigation and Strikes

I am glad to contribute this twelfth annual lecture celebrating the memory of Nancy Schwartz. Many of us remember the years in the 1970s when the most exciting developments in the theory of industrial organization were in the series of articles by the prolific team of Morton Kamien and Nancy Schwartz. Nancy’s work with Mort initiated a renaissance based on explicit analysis of strategic behavio...