Unifying Leakage Models: From Probing Attacks to Noisy Leakage
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Unifying Leakage Models: From Probing Attacks to Noisy Leakage
A recent trend in cryptography is to formally show the leakage resilience of cryptographic implementations in a given leakage model. One of the most prominent leakage models – the so-called bounded leakage model – assumes that the amount of leakage is a-priori bounded. Unfortunately, it has been pointed out that the assumption of bounded leakages is hard to verify in practice. A more realistic ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Cryptology
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0933-2790,1432-1378
DOI: 10.1007/s00145-018-9284-1