منابع مشابه
Discriminatory versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium
A goal of this paper is to compare results for discriminatory auctions to results for uniform-price auctions when suppliers have capacity constraints. We have a pretty good understanding of what equilibrium results look like for the uniform-price auctions. But an unresolved problem is what happens when a discriminative auction is run and suppliers have capacity constraints. We formulate a suppl...
متن کاملTariffs versus anti-dumping duties
Article history: Received 3 March 2009 Received in revised form 14 July 2009 Accepted 3 September 2009 Available online 14 October 2009 Tariffs and anti-dumping duties are two important tools used to protect industries from foreign competition and to generate revenue. While the two tools have been studied extensively in separate contexts, little is known about their comparative effects. This pa...
متن کاملTariffs versus Production Subsidies as Industry Protection
This paper provides a welfare comparison of a tariff with a combination of a production subsidy to, and a commodity tax on, an import-competing commodity in a two-country economy. We treat some plausible situations of industry protection, including where the initial tariff is above the optimal tariff, where a certain output level of a tariff-imposed commodity must be maintained, and where there...
متن کاملMassively parallel computation of large-scale spatial price equilibrium models with discriminatory ad valorem tariffs
In this paper, we develop a perfectly competitive spatial equilibrium model in price and quantity variables in the presence of discriminatory ad valorem tariffs, a widely used trade policy instrument. We derive the equilibrium conditions and formulate them as a variational inequality problem. An algorithm is then proposed for the computation of the equilibrium pattern and convergence results es...
متن کاملUniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence
In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the sellers cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Development Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1363-6669
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00616.x