Uniform Pricing Versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant o¤ering a di¤erentiated product. The most reasonable perfect bayesian equilibrium is either the least cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low cost monopoly prices. The...
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IN THE LITERATURE OF monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, it has been widely held that a change in aggregate Marshallian social welfare by price discrimination is negative if total output decreases. Among others, Schwartz [1990] verifies this conjecture for any total cost function that depends only on total output, not on its distribution among markets. Letting ∆X and ∆W denote a cha...
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VARIAN [1985] AND SCHWARTZ [1990] PROVED THAT, very generally, monopolistic third-degree price discrimination decreases aggregate welfare if total output falls (a conjecture which dates back to the work of A. C. Pigou, [1920]). In particular, these authors adopted a representative consumer approach (by assuming quasi-linear preferences) and used revealed-preference arguments. En passant, their ...
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This article proposes a different pricing scheme for software companies targeting customers based on customers’ software efficacy. Normally, software companies optimize prices by charging a higher price on highly effective software users while charging a discount price on less effective software users (Varian’s versioning scheme). The pricing pattern could be reversed if network effect between ...
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This paper studies third-degree price discrimination by transport facilities, such as airports and seaports, which sell access to the infrastructure as a necessary input for downstream production. These facilities are prone to congestion –which makes downstream markets interrelated– and their ownership structure is diverse, varying from public (domestic welfare maximizing) to private (profit ma...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3540156