Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Decision making under ignorance
Ignorance is an extreme form of uncertainty. In most narrow and technical sense, it means inability to assign a meaningful probability to the phenomena of interest. In more general sense, the state of ignorance is the result of the absence of knowledge about structural factors that influence the issues, the lack of reliable information or inability to completely determine the space of alternati...
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A new investigation is launched into the problem of decision-making in the face of 'complete ignorance', and linked to the problem of social choice. In the first section the author introduces a set of properties which might characterize a criterion for decision-making under complete ignorance. Two of these properties are novel: 'independence of non-discriminating states', and 'weak pessimism'. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Psychology
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0022-2496
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmp.2012.07.006