Unfair Competition by Government Firms and Authorities in the Consulting Market
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Unfair Competition by Government Firms and Authorities in the Consulting Market
Government firms and authorities often sell services in the free market via affiliated consulting firms (CFs). In this study, I analyse whether these agents have an unfair competitive edge compared to private CFs. The theoretical analysis shows that private and state-owned CFs operate under different conditions. A private CF must choose between having permanent employees and pay full-time wages...
متن کاملWhen Market Competition Benefits Firms
A conventional wisdom in economics posits that more intense market competition, measured in almost any way, reduces firm profit. In this paper, we challenge this conventional wisdom in a simple Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein an efficient firm (dominant firm) competes against less efficient firms (fringe firms). We find that an increase in the number of fringe firms can sti...
متن کاملThe relationship between competition law and capital market in Iran
stock market is run by special regulations. accordingly, analyzing the issues about the relation between the competition law and capital market such as stock market officials and their boundaries in the context of setting, controlling and enforcing rules, the generality or specificity of such rules, the controllability of stock market in comparison to the general competition rules and the stat...
متن کاملThe Impact of Product Market Competition on Firms’ Payout Policy
This paper investigates the interaction between product market competition and managers’ decision to distribute cash to shareholders. Using a large sample of manufacturing firms, we find that firms in more competitive industries pay more dividends than firms in less competitive markets. Further, consistent with agency theory, we find that the effect of product market competition on corporate pa...
متن کاملMarket Competition and Managerial Incentives with Heterogeneous Firms
We incorporate managerial e¤orts inside rms in a standard monopolistic competition model a la Krugman(1980) with heterogenous rms. The manager works to increase probability of productivity improvement for the rm. Due to unobservable managerial e¤ort and limited liability, the optimal managerial compensation scheme links the market performance of the rm to managerial incentives. Managers in ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3677837