Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
The unequivocal majority of a social choice rule F is the minimum number of agents that must agree on their best alternative in order to guarantee that this alternative is the only one prescribed by F . If the unequivocal majority of F is larger than the minimum possible value, then some of the alternatives prescribed by F are undesirable (there exists a di¤erent alternative which is the most p...
متن کاملOn Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a str...
متن کاملA necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
We consider an allocation problem with indivisible goods, and characterize weak Maskin monotonic allocation rules based on the robustness to group manipulation. Specifically, we introduce a new condition called unimprovement property of unmatched agents which means that unmatched agents cannot be strictly better off through any group manipulation. We show that a non-wasteful allocation rule sat...
متن کاملDomains of Social Choice Functions on Which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity Are Equivalent
It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some ...
متن کاملMaskin-monotonic scoring rules
We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are neutral, Maskin-monotonicity turns out to be equivalent to Nash-implementability within the class of scoring...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0377-5