Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity in Unemployment Insurance
It is well known that higher unemployment bene ts lead to longer unemployment durations. This result has been interpreted as evidence of moral hazarda behavioral response to distorted marginal incentives to search. This paper shows that unemployment bene ts also raise durations through a liquiditye¤ect for households who cannot smooth consumption perfectly. The empirical importance of the ...
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a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the e...
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This paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance (UI) schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard. We consider changes in the size and duration of UI benefits, and the effects of experience rating, and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation. Radical changes in the current UI system increase welfare, but not by much. A move to ...
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We study a dynamic model with positive gross flows between employment and unemployment. There is moral hazard associated with search effort and job-retention effort. A quantitative comparison of the unemployment insurance system currently in place in the United States with an optimal system shows that the optimal system reduces the steady state unemployment rate by 3.40 percentage points and in...
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A firm is subject to accident risk, which the manager can mitigate by exerting effort. An agency problem arises because effort is unobservable and the manager has limited liability. The occurrence of accidents is modelled as a Poisson process, whose intensity is controlled by the manager. We use martingale techniques to formulate the manager’s incentive compatibility constraints. The optimal co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00302.x