Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash Wage Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Spatial Equilibrium with Unemployment and Wage Bargaining: Theory and Estimation∗
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/597302