Undominated Maximals: General Definition and Characterizations
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper proposes a general definition of an undominated maximal relation on constraint set. No specific requirement is imposed either the asymmetry objective or set (which might, might not, coincide with ground relation). Several characterizations are formulated that express maximals as some trace associated relation. By means these characterizations, structure entire examined in particular case relations induced by open and closed convex cones—among them, weak strong Pareto dominance—and, semiorders, admit certain types representability. The results last part examination allow construction many examples whose sets completely identifiable elementary way.
منابع مشابه
3-5-Man Chess: Maximals and Mzugs
This note reports the combined results of several initiatives in creating and surveying complete suites of endgame tables (EGTs) to the Depth to Mate (DTM) and Depth to Conversion (DTC) metrics. Data on percentage results, maximals and mutual zugzwangs, mzugs, has been filed and made available on the web, as have the DTM EGTs.
متن کاملWelfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents’ valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of Groves mechanisms achieves this; however, these mechanisms require the agents to make payments, thereby reducing the agents’ total welfare. In this paper we ...
متن کاملUndominated Groves Mechanisms
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCGmechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. We co...
متن کاملGeneral Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis
We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms, scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not quite qualify as one or the other. Our main result is a characterization theorem, yielding characterizations for all of these settings, including a new characterization of scoring rules for non-convex sets of distributions. We generalize this model to ...
متن کاملUndominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents’ payments will sum to more than 0. Very recently, several mec...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2227-7390']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/math11183879