Understanding Game Theory via Wireless Power Control [Lecture Notes]
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Understanding Game Theory via Wireless Power Control
In this lecture note, we introduce the basic concepts of game theory (GT), a branch of mathematics traditionally studied and applied in the areas of economics, political science, and biology, which has emerged in the last fifteen years as an effective framework for communications, networking, and signal processing (SP). The real catalyzer has been the blooming of all issues related to distribut...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Signal Processing Magazine
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1053-5888
DOI: 10.1109/msp.2015.2406338