Uncivil Disobedience: Political Commitment and Violence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Columbia Law Review Sidebar
Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and David Pozen (BP&P) strikingly identify and intriguingly elaborate a new category of political dissent, uncivil obedience, which they propose serves as a complement to the betterknown political category civil disobedience.1 Civil disobedience familiarly involves law-breaking that aims not at impunity but rather legal reform and thus arises in the context of re...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Res Publica
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1356-4765,1572-8692
DOI: 10.1007/s11158-017-9367-0