Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining*

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer-specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—...

Quantal Response Equilibria of Ultimatum Bargaining Games

This paper applies quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games and Economic Behavior) to ultimatum bargaining games. When the strategy space is discrete, as the noise vanishes, the QRE of the normal-form representation converges to a Nash equilibrium in which an equilibrium o er is between 0 and a half of the pie while the QRE of the extensive-form representatio...

Bargaining over time in ultimatum game experiments

We report the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to the subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game. We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baselin...

A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining

Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining

Adaptive learning and a fairness motive we call ‘‘punishment’’ are the basis for two prominent and substantially different types of theories of ultimatum bargaining behavior. We compare adaptive learning and fairness in an experiment that involves punishment and reward versions of the ultimatum game. We draw conclusions concerning the abilities and limitations of both types of theories. The res...