Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TUgame is obtained by taking the Myerson graph restricted game and of that the Kamijo partition restricted game. In this game the dividend...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1961505