Two-stage Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Game under Fuzzy Optimistic Coalition

The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems

We associate an optimistic TU game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N\S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N\S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.

The irreducible Core of a minimum cost spanning tree game

It is a known result that for a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) game a Core allocation can be deduced directly from a mcst in the underlying network. To determine this Core allocation one only needs to determine a mcst in the network and it is not necessary to calculate the coalition values of the corresponding mcst game. In this paper we will deduce other Core allocations directly from the n...

Fair cost-sharing methods for the minimum spanning tree game

Reload cost problems: minimum diameter spanning tree

We examine a network design problem under the reload cost model. Given an undirected edge colored graph, reload costs on a path arise at a node where the path uses consecutive edges of di(erent colors. We consider the problem of 0nding a spanning tree of minimum diameter with respect to the reload costs. We present lower bounds for the approximability even on graphs with maximum degree 5. On th...

Multi-criteria minimum cost spanning tree games

The minimum cost spanning tree game (mcst-game) is a well-known model within operations research games that has been widely studied in the literature. In this paper we introduce the multi-criteria version of the mcst-game as a setvalued TU-game. We prove that the extension of Bird s cost allocation rule provides dominance core elements in this game. We also give a family of core solutions that ...