Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-Proofness for Hospitals in Matching Markets
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1