Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A One-sided Matching with Dynamic Preferences
In recent years, the problem of allocating indivisible resources to self-interested agents has generated an interesting, rich interplay at the interface of computer science, economics, and game theory. Most theoretical frameworks and empirical studies for resource allocation encompass a wide range of desirable economic properties such as efficiency, truthfulness, and fairness. In addition, a br...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130272