Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A One-sided Matching with Dynamic Preferences
In recent years, the problem of allocating indivisible resources to self-interested agents has generated an interesting, rich interplay at the interface of computer science, economics, and game theory. Most theoretical frameworks and empirical studies for resource allocation encompass a wide range of desirable economic properties such as efficiency, truthfulness, and fairness. In addition, a br...
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We are given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a ∈ A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of b ∈ B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M ′ such that the number of vertices that prefer M ′ to M exceeds the number that prefer M to M ′. We sho...
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One-sided matching is concerned with the allocation of indivisible objects to a set of agents, in the absence of monetary transfers. In contrast to many real-life scenarios such as shift scheduling or course assignment, traditional matching mechanisms assume that agents precisely know their preferences. However, preferences over alternatives may change over time due to idiosyncratic reasons or ...
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One of the core problems in multiagent systems is how to efficiently allocate a set of indivisible resources to a group of self-interested agents that compete over scarce and limited alternatives. In these settings, mechanism design approaches such as matching mechanisms and auctions are often applied to guarantee fairness and efficiency while preventing agents from manipulating the outcomes. I...
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Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170115