Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Two-player incentive compatible mechanisms are affine maximizers
In mechanism design, for a given type space, there may be incentive compatible mechanisms which are not affine maximizers. We prove that for two-player games on a discrete type space, any given mechanism can be turned into an affine maximizer through a nontrivial perturbation of the type space. Furthermore, our theorem is the strongest possible in this setup. Our proof relies on new results on ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Linear Algebra and its Applications
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0024-3795
DOI: 10.1016/j.laa.2019.04.027