Two Kinds of Process or Two Kinds of Processing? Disambiguating Dual-Process Theories

Abstract Dual-Process Theories (D-PTs) claim there are two qualitatively different types of processes in the human brain-mind. Despite forming basis for several areas cognitive science, they still shrouded ambiguity: critics erroneously attack D-PTs as a whole (e.g., Evans and Stanovich Perspectives on Psychological Science , 8(3), 2013), qualitative/quantitative distinction is not clear enough (De Neys 16 (6): 1412–1427, 2021; Dewey 2022) and, given this criterion, deciding between qualitative or quantitative differences may even be scientifically irrelevant 2021). As way disambiguating discussion clarifying what exactly means to existence second type process, I define possible categories D-PT: The substantial instrumental. In case, Type 2 subpersonal level ones. instrumental processing personal phenomenon that does necessarily imply processes. Discussing implications each categories, use main example illustrate ambiguity – exercise disambiguation model proposed by (2013), making its character, contrast it with Frankish’ (2009) case D-PT. Finally, discuss contributions can make. By clearer, provide relatively unanimous framework dual- single-process theorists (the version) clearer desiderata those wishing defend substantive one.