Two-Agent Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Agents: Almost Full Characterizations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper o§ers a compl...
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We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest” individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome (according to preferences in the true state) than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, the pre...
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An individual may display an honesty standard which allows her to lie a little without that being harmful to her self view as an honest person. On this basis, the paper considers a society with a finite number of individuals involving partially-honest individuals and in which every individual has her own honesty standard. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, i...
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We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen [Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals, Game Econ. Behav. 74 (2012) 154-169.] in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementat...
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[Moore and Repullo, Econometrica 58 (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, Rev. Econom. Stud. 58 (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin’s classic paper [Maskin, Rev. Econom. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu, http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294, Inter. J. Quantum Information, 2010 (accepted)] shows that when an additional ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1726542