Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Computer and System Sciences
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0022-0000
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.010