Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents

In this paper we study optimization problems with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents introduced by Auletta et al. [ICALP 2004]. Our goal is to allocate load among the agents, provided that the secret data of each agent is a single positive rational number: the cost they incur per unit load. In such a setting the payment is given after the load completion, therefore if a positive load is as...

متن کامل

Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents

In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorith...

متن کامل

Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Agents

In this paper we study optimization problems with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents introduced by Auletta et al. [ICALP 2004]. Our goal is to allocate load among the agents, provided that the secret data of each agent is a single positive rational number: the cost they incur per unit load. In such a setting the payment is given after the load completion, therefore if a positive load is as...

متن کامل

Truthful Single - Parameter Mechanisms ETH

We have seen that the Vickrey (second-price) auction has several desirable properties: it incentivizes bidders to bid truthfully, it assigns the item to the bidder with the highest value, it can be computed in polynomial time. We will define a general class of mechanism design problems; these will be characterized by the fact that each agent’s private information (its value in the case of the s...

متن کامل

Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines Using ACO

Task scheduling is a major challenge in parallel and distributed systems. Task scheduling techniques in distributed systems are usually based on trusting the Accuracy of the information about the status of resources. In a commercial multiCloud environment, individual providers are focused towards increasing their own profits and do not care about the utility of users and other providers. In suc...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Theory of Computing Systems

سال: 2010

ISSN: 1432-4350,1433-0490

DOI: 10.1007/s00224-010-9281-8