Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Truthful Learning Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions with Externalities
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applicationsof microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usuallydesigned to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and, at thesame time, to assure both the advertisers and the auctioneer a non–negativeutility. Nonetheless, in sponsored search auctions, the click–through–rates<...
متن کاملA truthful learning mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
In recent years, effective sponsored search auctions (SSAs) have been designed to incentivize advertisers (advs) to bid their truthful valuations and, at the same time, to assure both the advs and the auctioneer a non–negative utility. Nonetheless, when the click–through–rates (CTRs) of the advs are unknown to the auction, these mechanisms must be paired with a learning algorithm for the estima...
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In pay-per-click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their advertisements (ads for short). A sponsored search auction for a keyword is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities μij associ...
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In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their ads. This auction is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T ). There are click probabilities μij associated with each agent-slot pairs. The goal of the searc...
متن کاملA novel ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auctions
In this paper, we advance the state-of-the-art in designing ex-post truthful multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions (SSA) through two different contributions. First, we prove two important impossibility results which rule out the possibility of an expost monotone MAB allocation rule having sublinear regret with time when the click through rates (CTR) of the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2015.05.012