Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender-Receiver Games*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth-telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions and are more likely ...
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This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov and Squintani [15] in the leading example of the CrawfordSobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the -noise model of Blume, Board and Kawamura [4], including outcomes wi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0347-0520
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12003