Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
In this paper we consider the Minimum Cost Spanning Tree model. We assume that a central planner aims at implementing a minimum cost spanning tree not knowing the true link costs. The central planner sets up a game where agents announce link costs, a tree is chosen and costs are allocated according to the rules of the game. We characterize ways of allocating costs such that true announcements c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.05.023