Truth pluralism without domains
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Truth pluralists say that truth-bearers in different “discourses”, “domains”, “domains of discourse”, or inquiry” are apt to be true ways – for instance, mathematical discourse ethical is a way ordinary descriptive scientific discourse. Moreover, the notion “domain” often explicitly employed formulating pluralist theories truth. Consequently, attracting increasing attention, both critical and constructive. I argue this red herring. First, identify theoretical role which appeal domains, answer what call “Individuation Problem”: saying determines particular truth-bearer true. Second, need not domains purpose. thus conclude that, despite usual glossing view, there no play pluralist’s theory defuses “Problem Mixed Atomics” allows sidestep potentially intractable disputes about nature domains.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0039-7857', '1573-0964']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03828-2