Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
husserl’s phenomenological constitution: intersubjectivity: truth and objectivity
the present article studies husserl’s solution about the possibility of knowledge. this solution expresses itself in the constitutive analyses that he has made. by using decartes’methodic doubt, husserl establishes pure consciousness. then he describes phenomenologically its data and shows how to be constituted phenomena in consciousness. after explaining the process of the constitution of mate...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Inquiry
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0020-174X,1502-3923
DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2020.1805708