Truth and Falsity in Buridan’s Bridge

This paper revisits Buridan’s Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in Bradwardine’s Insolubilia. Prompted by occurrence Cervantes’s Don Quixote, I discuss and compare four distinct solutions problem, namely “just false” conception, “contingently true/false” theory, “both true view, then “neither simpliciter nor false simpliciter” account proposed more recently Jacquette. All have common accept that expresses truth-apt proposition, but only latter three endorse transparency truth. Against some previous commentaries first show solution is fully compliant with an within classical logic. argue insights, as well Jacquette’s treatment, are both supportive dialetheist account, particular strict-tolerant defend intuitions (whether LP or ST guise) against two objections: one concerning future, other alleged simplicity compared Liar.