منابع مشابه
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Increasingly, scholars of legislative politics propose comparative analyses of parliamentary voting behavior across different countries and parliaments. Yet parliamentary voting procedures differ dramatically across parliamentary chambers and ignoring these differences may, in the extreme, lead to meaningless comparisons. In this paper we present a first glimpse at a comprehensive data collecti...
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We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whosemembers fear being blamed by partisan observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that such social pressure, like optimal taxation, can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, institutions may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.005