Transferable Utility Cooperative Differential Games with Continuous Updating Using Pontryagin Maximum Principle

The Pontryagin Maximum Principle

Theorem (PontryaginMaximum Principle). Suppose a final time T and controlstate pair (û, x̂) on [τ, T ] give the minimum in the problem above; assume that û is piecewise continuous. Then there exist a vector of Lagrange multipliers (λ0, λ) ∈ R × R with λ0 ≥ 0 and a piecewise smooth function p: [τ, T ] → R n such that the function ĥ(t) def =H(t, x̂(t), p(t), û(t)) is piecewise smooth, and one has ̇̂ ...

The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility

I adapt Raiffa's discrete bargaining solution in order to take the possibility of partial cooperation into account when there are more than two players. The approach is non-cooperative. I slightly modify the bargaining procedure proposed by Sjöström for supporting the Raiffa solution, exactly as Hart and MasColell introduced the possibility of partial cooperation in (a slight variation of) the ...

The Maximum Principle of Pontryagin

Mean-Field Pontryagin Maximum Principle

We derive a Maximum Principle for optimal control problems with constraints given by the coupling of a system of ODEs and a PDE of Vlasov-type. Such problems arise naturally as Γ-limits of optimal control problems subject to ODE constraints, modeling, for instance, external interventions on crowd dynamics. We obtain these first-order optimality conditions in the form of Hamiltonian flows in the...

Transferable utility games with uncertainty

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Wea...