TRANSFER PRICING: DAMPAK BEBAN PAJAK, TUNNELING INCENTIVE, DAN PROFITABILITAS

Contractual Pricing with Incentive Constraints

Extending the notion of contractual pricing introduced by Makowski and Ostroy (2003) to economies with moral hazard, this paper develops a model of team formation and organized competition with three main contributions. Firstly, a team’s organization is defined as an allocation of (public or private) commodities together with incentive compatible actions and information to its members. Secondly...

Incentive pricing in multiclass systems

Incentive Pricing in Multi-Class Communication Networks

We consider a communication network that ooers multi-class services to multiple types of traac. Users choose service classes so as to optimize their own performance. The network associates with each traac type a nominal service class. Optimal prices should provide incentives for the users to assign each traac type to its nominal service class. We establish necessary and suucient conditions for ...

Incentive-Compatible Pricing Strategies in Noncooperative Networks

The complexity of modern networks calls for decentralized control schemes where each user makes its control decisions independently based on some individual performance objectives. The operating points of such noncooperative networks are the Nash equilibria of the underlying control game. Nash equilibria are generically inefficient and lead to suboptimal network performance. Using routing as a ...

Optimal incentive-compatible pricing for M/G/1 queues

This paper extends previous research on congested service facilities to generalized service distributions, a significant extension given the limitations of exponential distributions for networked computer job modeling. Building on the framework first presented in Mendelson and Whang (1990), we present fundamental theorems for non-priority M/G/1 queues, nonpreemptive M/G/1 queues, and preemptive...